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DON'T BUY ... RENT!
MARYlAND LAW PROVIDES LIMITLESS INSURANCE FOR
TENANTS AGAINST CRIMINAL ACTIVIlY AFTER
HEMMINGS v. PELHAM WOOD l
I.

INTRODUCTION
Tragic cases may have tragic consequences when sympathy
for a plaintiff interferes with a court's ability to analyze the
facts and apply the law. Sympathy for the victim of a tragedy
should not serve as a substitute for evidence of duty, culpability, and proximate cause. 2
- Former Judge Howard S. Chasanow,
Court of Appeals of Maryland

Howard Hemmings was fatally shot in his own apartment on June
13, 1998. 3 About an hour after midnight, an unidentified intruder
forcibly entered his Pelham Wood apartment, in Baltimore County,
Maryland, where he resided with his wife. 4 The intruder entered the
apartment through a sliding glass door in the back of the apartment
building. 5 Once inside the apartment, the intruder shot Howard
twice in the abdomen. 6 Although he was able to call "911," Howard
died from the gunshot wounds later that morning. 7
Regrettably, senseless violence occurs in our society on a daily basis. 8
The statistical data on crime committed in the State of Maryland is
staggering. 9 In 2001, Maryland reported 42,088 violent crimes. lO
1. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d
443 (2003) [hereinafter Hemmings II].
2. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 584, 719 A.2d
119,138 (1998) (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
3. City/County Digest: Hillendale Man Is Victim of Fatal Shooting, BALT. SUN, June
16, 1998, at 3B.
4. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 144 Md. App. 311, 314,
797 A.2d 851, 853 (2002) [hereinafter Hemmings I], rev'd, 375 Md. 522,
826 A.2d 443 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528,826 A.2d at 447.
7. Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. at 314, 797 A.2d at 853.
8. The United States Department of Justice reported 5,341,410 crimes of violence in 2002. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2002 Statistical Tables, tbl.
1, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cVlls02.pdf (Dec. 2003).
9. See United States Department ofJustice, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Reported
Crime in Maryland, at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/
Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (last modified Apr. 14,2003) (se-
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Four hundred and forty-six of those crimes were murder and nonnegligent manslaughterY
When violence touches our lives, our instinct is to search for someone to blame. 12 A criminal who perpetrates a crime should be held
accountable and deserves punishment for his violent actions. 13 In our
overly litigious society, however, it is common for victims and their
attorneys to believe that there may be someone else at fault for serious
injuries resulting from a criminal's violent actions. 14 Victims and their

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

lect the "Maryland" option to access this report, which provides data on the
increasing rate of violent crime in Maryland from 1960-2001).
Id.
Id.
See Lawrence M. Solan, Symposium: Responsibility and Blame: Psychological and
Legal Perspectives: Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68· BROOK. L.
REv. 1003, 1003-04 (2003). Sometimes a person thinks: "Something bad
happened because someone did (didn't do) something. (That person
should have known better.) I don't want things like this to happen. When
I think about the bad thing that happened, I also think about the fact that
this person did something to make it happen." Id. at 1009. See generally
Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 257 (1987). Kadish
stated that:
In both criminal law and everyday moral judgments the concept of
excuse plays a crucial role. This is because the practice of blaming
is intrinsically selective .... Excuse is one of those central concepts
that serve to draw the line between the blameworthy and the
blameless and so make a blaming system possible.
Id.
The Annotated Code of Maryland states that "[a] person who commits a
murder in the first degree is guilty of a felony and on conviction shall be
sentenced to: (i) death; (ii) imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole; or (iii) imprisonment for life." See MD. CODE ANN., CRlM. LAw § 2201(b)(1) (2002).
The extension of tort law and the shifting of fault began in the 1960s. See
generally Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68
BROOK. L. REv. 1031, 1033-35 (2003). Sebok states:
[T]ort law did not really exhibit pro-plaintiff tendencies until
about 1960. The litany of changes are well known. Courts and legislatures abolished immunities for charities, governments and family members. They eliminated auto-guest statutes and guest
doctrines. Tort law dissolved the special rules of liability for landowners, sometimes even with regard to trespassers. In medical malpractice, the elimination of the locality rule and the emergence of
patient-oriented informed consent made it easier for plaintiffs to
overcome physician defenses. Courts recognized new affirmative
duties on the part of building owners, therapists and others to prevent injuries to third parties. Bars and liquor stores acquired the
obligation to prevent injuries caused by drunk driving, as did, on
occasion, social hosts. The expansion and codification of manufacturers' obligations to consumers, which existed since the early part
of the twentieth century, catalyzed the emerging doctrine of strict
products liability. The emergence of negligent infliction of emotional distress under the bystander rule and intentional infliction
of emotional distress created entirely new forms of civil wrong.
Comparative fault replaced the defense of contributory negligence,
and many courts merged the defense of assumption of risk into
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families often ask whether an injury or murder could have been prevented, and who could have prevented it.ls
It is a long-standing principle of Maryland law that, except for the
limited circumstances in which the relationship between the parties
creates a special duty, crime victims may not hold third parties responsible. 16 This was also true of landlord-tenant relations. Yet, reversing
this long-standing precedent and joining a national trend towards
landlord liability, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held that
there may be someone other than the criminal who bears the responsibility for the incident described above: the landlord of the apartment complex in which Howard Hemmings livedP
In Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liability Ltd. Partnership (Hemmings 11),18 a four-to-three decision by the court of appeals, the responsibilities of a landlord were significantly broadened. 19
Specifically, the court held that a landlord can be liable under a negligence theory for the criminal acts of a third party occurring within the
leased premises. 20 The majority held a landlord must act to prevent
violence perpetrated on a tenant, in the tenant's own apartment, by
criminals unknown to the landlord. 21
This comment explores the court's far-reaching decision in light of
the increasing trend in Maryland to impose liability on landlords. Section II explores the historical development of Maryland common law
regarding landlords' duties toward their tenants. Section III comcomparative fault. Courts and legislatures relaxed the rules of causation as well, first with the introduction of alternative liability,
then with the expansion of the substantial factor test through the
introduction of concepts like market-share liability and loss of
chance. As Gary Schwartz famously commented, until the early
1980s, the modern cases added to case books were "almost all triumphs for the plaintiffs; the collection of these cases could be referred to as 'plaintiffs' greatest hits.'" One popular explanation for
the rise of the plaintiff in the 1960s is that the shift of the balance
of power away from defendants and toward victims was an extension of the basic concept of negligence that had developed in
American law in the nineteenth century.
Id.
15. See generally Solan, supra note 12, at 1009.
16. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976);
Moore v. Jimel, Inc., 147 Md. App. 336, 346,809 A.2d 10, 15 (2002). In
Maryland, "a private person is under no special duty to protect another
from criminal acts by a third person." Moare, 147 Md. App. at 346,809 A.2d
at 15.
17. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455 (holding that a landlord
may be held liable for the criminal acts of third parties perpetrated on a
tenant within the tenant's own apartment).
18. 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443.
19. See id. at 543,826 A.2d at 455 (expanding a landlord's duty to use reasonable care to prevent harm to his tenants beyond the common areas of the
complex).
20. See id.
21. Id.
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pares the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Hemmings II to
judicial decisions in numerous states regarding the same issue. Section III also argues that Maryland should have followed the rationale
of other states by refusing to extend to landlords the duty to protect
tenants from the criminal acts of third parties. Section IV explains the
broader social and economic ramifications of the Hemmings II decision and its probable effect on landlords and tenants alike. Section V
concludes this comment by rejecting the notion that landlords should
be the ultimate insurance policy for tenants. This section further opposes the court's continued movement to decrease individual responsibility and impose overbroad duties absent statutes or certain special
relationships. In the Hemmings II decision, a split court of appeals
established yet another legal avenue for litigious individuals to shift
moral blame to third parties when tragedy occurs.22
II.

HISTORICAL ANAYLSIS OF MARYLAND CASE LAW REGARDING THE DUTIES OF LANDLORDS

A.

The Easy Days Gone By

In the past it was relatively simple for attorneys to advise landlord
clients regarding the Maryland law: no duty was owed to tenants once
the owner parted with control of the leased premises. 23 For over one
hundred years, Maryland law was well settled that the tenant had the
burden of maintaining the premises in the absence of an agreement
22. See generally Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443; Sebok, supra note 14,
at lO33-35 (discussing the shift of blame in American tort law).
23. See Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161 A. 172, 172 (1932) (holding
that the landlord was not liable for injuries to a guest of a tenant who fell
into a pit). In Marshall, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that" [t] he
law is well settled that, when the owner has parted with his control, the
tenant has the burden of the proper keeping of the premises, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary; and for any nuisance created by the
tenant the landlord is not responsible." [d. (citations omitted). According
to earlier notions of landlord-tenant law, the tenant took the leased property as he found it, and the landlord was not responsible for any defect on
the property or injury sustained by the tenant while on the property. See,
e.g., Smith v. State ex rel. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 529-30, 48 A. 92, 93 (1901).
For example, if the property was to fall down, the landlord was under no
obligation to repair it, unless expressly stated by contract; however, the tenant was still under an obligation to pay rent. [d. As one commentator eloquently stated:
It all made sense back in those days with the landlord off on the
hunt or drinking port in the quiet of the evening, and the tenant
asking only to be left alone to tend his fences and to shear his
sheep. . .. The model landlord was the one who did the least. The
tenant, in turn, was expected to run the farm, to be the omnicompetent man fully prepared to see to his own shelter, heat and light.
Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225,
231 (1970).
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to the contrary.24 The landlord's obligation extended only as far as
turning over possession of the property to the tenant and an agreement to leave that tenant in peaceful possession. 25
Maryland cases repeated language to that effect. 26 Specifically, the
cases held that mere ownership of land or buildings did not render
the owner liable for injuries sustained by tenants or invitees rightfully
on the premises because the owner was not considered an insurer of
such persons. 27 This doctrinal theory was based on the notion that
the lease was a conveyance of interest in the property,28 and not a
contractual undertaking of the landlord. 29

B.

Common Areas Must Be Maintained to Protect Tenants from Personal
Injury

Over the years, landlords were given more responsibility under
leases,3o and the Court of Appeals of Maryland modified the common
law according to the changing nature of the tenant. 31 Based on such
changes, landlords owed tenants the duty to exercise ordinary care to
render the premises reasonably safe, regardless of an express contract. 32 A landlord's duty was ordinary care and diligence to maintain
24. See, e.g., Marshal~ 162 Md. at 689,161 A. at 172; Millerv. Fisher, 111 Md. 91,
94, 73 A. 891, 892 (1909); Smith, 92 Md. at 529-30, 48 A. at 93; Owings v.
Jones, 9 Md. 108, 108-09 (1856).
25. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at 227 n.2.
26. See, e.g., Marshall, 162 Md. at 689, 161 A. at 172; Miller, III Md. at 94, 73 A.
at 892.
27. See Marshall, 162 Md. at 689,161 A. at 172; Miller, 111 Md. at 94,73 A. at
892.
28. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at.228 n.4.
29. See id. at 229 n.5 (explaining that the "duty of the landlord was imposed by
the law through the device of an implied covenant").
30. See Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?, 2
CARDozo L. REv. 299, 301-03 (1981) (explaining the historical development of landlord-tenant common law throughout the United States). Specifically, Haines stated that:
During the Industrial Revolution, with the growing urbanization of
the population, the agricultural lease declined in importance.
Structures on the leased land became increasingly significant in the
lease transaction. Specific covenants were inserted in leases apportioning the responsibility between, and protecting the rights of,
landlord and tenant. Thus, "the typical lease began to look more
like a contract than a deed of real estate," raising anew the question of how it should be treated.
[d. at 303.
31. See Landay v. Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 27-28, 150 A.2d 739, 741 (1959) (discussing the duty of a landlord to his tenant in Maryland in 1959).
32. See id., at 27, 150 A.2d at 740 (stating that "[w]here a landlord leases separate portions of a property to different tenants and reserves under his control halls, stairways or other parts of the property for use in common by all
the tenants, he must use ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained parts in reasonably safe condition"). The court in Landay found that
"[t]he duty stems from the responsibility engendered in the landlord by his
having extended an invitation, express or implied, to use the portions of

136

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 34

the common areas. 33 Ordinary care and diligence did not include
protecting tenants from criminal acts of third parties; rather, it was
ordinary care that would ensure the property, buildings, and land
were safe for the tenants in their intended use. 34
Beginning in the 1960s, the Court of Appeals of Maryland furthered
its expansion of the common law doctrine regarding landlords' duties
towards tenants. 35 For example, in Langley Park APo:rtments v. Lund,36
the court extended the landlord's general duty to maintain common
areas to include the removal of snow and ice when the landlord was
aware or should have been aware of the dangerous condition. 37 The
court, however, was reluctant to make landlords "insurers" of tenants'
safety.38 In Langley Park Apartments, the court of appeals carefully
stated, "We do not mean to suggest that the mere fact that snow has
accumulated will in and of itself result in liability upon the landlord,
for that would make him virtually an insurer."39 The court implicitly
recognized that to place landlords in the position of ultimate insurer
of tenants' safety would be an enormous burden for landlords, while
taking away all accountability from tenants for their own action or inaction. 40 In this decision, the court of appeals expressly rejected the
role of landlord as an insurerY

C.

Security Gates and Locked Doors Become Necessary to Keep Criminals
from Entering Common Areas

Twelve years after the decision in Langley Park Apartments, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland answered three certified questions from the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 42 In Scott v.
Watson,43 the court faced the controversial question of whether a landlord had a duty to protect tenants "from the criminal acts of third
parties committed in common areas within the landlord's con-

33.

34.
35.

36.
37.

the property retained by him." [d. at 27, 150 A.2d at 741 (citations
omitted).
Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454, 457, 177 A.2d 263, 265 (1962)
(citing Long v. Joestiein, 193 Md. 211, 216, 66 A.2d 407, 409 (1949);
Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co., 183 Md. 285, 288, 37 A.2d 263, 264
(1944».
See id.
See generally Langley Park Apartments v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 407-10, 199
A.2d 620, 623-24 (1964).
234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964).
[d. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624.
[d. at 409-10, 199 A.2d at 624.

38.
39. [d.

40.
41.
42.
43.

See generally id.
See id.
See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 161-62,359 A.2d 548,550 (1976).
278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).

2004]

Don't Buy . .. Rent!

137

trol .... "44 The court came to two distinct conclusions regarding the
landlord's duty in Scott. 45
First, the court answered the question of whether a landlord had a
special duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third parties
committed in common areas within the landlord's contro1. 46 The
court declined to impose a special duty "upon the landlord to protect
his tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord's premises."47 The court reasoned that such a "general rule is a
subsidiary of the broader rule that a private person is under no special
duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person, in the
absence of statutes, or of a special relationship."48 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, therefore, "decline[d] to impose a special duty on
a landlord to protect his tenants from criminal activity since to do so
would place him perilously close to the position of insurer of his tenants' safety."49 Such language, repeated almost verbatim from earlier cases, 50 suggests that the court was steadfast in its holding that a
landlord should not be responsible for his tenants' safety. 51
Second, the Scott court was presented with the issue of whether a
general duty would "be imposed if the landlord had knowledge of increasing criminal activity on the premises."52 The court held that "[i]f
the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against persons or property in the common areas, he then has a duty to take
reasonable measures, in view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity."53 The court
explained that the "duty arises primarily from criminal activities existing on the landlord's premises, and not from knowledge of general
criminal activities in the neighborhood."54
Although the court noted that finding a landlord has breached his
duty to protect tenants from the criminal activities of third parties
does not alone overcome the hurdle of causation,55 Scott clearly set the
precedent for expansion of landlord liability. 56 The court attempted
to limit when a landlord may be liable for the criminal acts of another;
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.

[d. at 161-62, 359 A.2d at 550.
See id. at 167, 169, 359 A.2d at 553-54.
[d. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552.
[d.
[d. (summarizing the general principle set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
[d. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
See, e.g., Langley Park Apartments, 234 Md. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624.
Scott, 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
[d. at 162, 359 A.2d at 550.
[d. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
[d.
[d. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555 (stating that "the determination of proximate
cause is subject to considerations of fairness and social policy as well as
mere causation").
See id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
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however, the limitation was murky at best. 57 Accordingly, landlords
became targets for negligence cases of all kinds. 58
D.

Dogs Days for Landlords

An example of the wave of new negligence cases occurred in 1998,
when the court of appeals heard two similar cases involving a landlord's duty to his tenants in the same term. 59 Coincidentally, both
cases involved injuries inflicted by canines present on the leased
premises. 60 More importantly, both holdings stretched Maryland's
landlord liability in an unexpected manner.
In Shields v. Wagman, 61 two individuals sustained injuries when attacked by a pit bull owned by a tenant of a strip mal1. 62 The court
held that the landlord of the commercial property could be held liable for injuries sustained in the common area caused by a dog kept on
the leased premises. 63 Specifically, the court held that because "the
landlord had knowledge of the potential danger and the ability to rid
the premises of that danger by refusing to re-Iet the premise," the
landlord could be held liable. 64 The holding in Shields was foreseeable considering that the rationale of the court was similar to previous
landlord liability cases regarding common areas, specifically Scott. 65
The Shields court reasoned that because the landlord had control over
the common area of the property and knowledge of the viciousness of
the dog, the landlord could be held liable for the injuries sustained. 66
In the second "canine" case, Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Ltd.
Partnership,67 a sixteen-month-old child was attacked and killed by a pit
bull owned by a tenant of an apartment complex. 68 In a four-to-three
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998); Matthews v.
Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998), two
cases heard in the September Term, 1997, considering a landlord's duty
when a tenant's dog bites someone on his premises.
60. Shields, 350 Md. at 668-69, 714 A.2d at 882; Matthews, 351 Md. at 548, 719
A.2d at 120.
61. 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881.
62. Id. at 669, 714 A.2d at 882.
63. Id. at 668-69, 714 A.2d at 882.
64. [d. at 669, 714 A.2d at 882.
65. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165-69, 359 A.2d 548, 552-54 (1976); see also
Shields, 350 Md. at 673-77,714 A.2d at 884-86. The court in Shields discussed
Maryland cases regarding common areas and specifically stated:
l W] here a landlord leases separate portions of his property to different tenants and reserves under his control the passageways and
stairways, and other parts of the property for the common use of all
the tenants[,] he must then exercise ordinary care and diligence to
maintain the retained portions in a reasonably safe condition.
[d. at 673-74,714 A.2d at 884 (citations omitted).
66. [d. at 690-91, 714 A.2d at 892-93.
67. 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1997).
68. [d. at 548-51, 719 A.2d at 120-22.
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decision, the majority held that the landlord owed a duty of care to
visitors when the landlord had knowledge of the violent animal within
the tenant's apartment and the ability to take reasonable steps to protect against the animal's attack. 69 The court reasoned that although
the attack occurred within the leased premise of a residential building-within the tenant's apartment-the landlord could have taken
steps to retake possession of the apartment. 70
The Matthews court found that because "[t]he landlord retained
control over the presence of a dog in the leased premises by virtue of
the 'no pets' clause in the lease," the landlord could have brought a
breach of lease action to evict the tenant. 71 The court further stated
that prior to bringing such an action, the landlord should have informed the tenant that harboring the pit bull was a violation of the
lease upon receiving notice of the presence of a canine.72 Naively, the
court believed that if the landlord had taken such steps, the tenant
would have removed the canine from the leased premise. 73 But because the landlord took no action, the court found that the landlord
was negligent and affirmed the decision of the circuit court, awarding
over five million dollars in damages. 74
Comparing Scott and Shields with Matthews, there is an obvious deviation in the holding of Matthews, which usurps the court's previous
holdings. Specifically, the Matthews court reasoned that a duty exists
even though the injury occurred within the leased premises,75 in direct
contrast with the holdings in Scott and Shields, that a landlord may only
be liable for injuries that occur in common areas. 76 The court attempted to downplay this change, stating that the key is to determine
if the landlord has control over whether the tenant can remain in the

69. [d. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
70. [d. at 558,719 A.2d at 125-26. The dissent quickly points out that the landlord had no ability to repossess the property for numerous reasons. [d. at
590-91,719 A.2d at 142 (Chasanow,j., dissenting).
71. [d. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125-26.
72. [d. at 558, 719 A.2d at 126.
73. [d.
74. [d. at 522,583,719 A.2d at 122,138. In Matthews, the jury awarded damages
as follows: $5,018,750 to Matthews (the mother of the victim) and $562,100
to the father of victim for the wrongful death of Tevin; $600,000 non-economic damages and $4,147.52 compensatory damages to Tevin's estate
under the survival action; and $1,110,000 to Matthews as damages for intentional "infliction of emotional distress." [d. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122. "The
court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress count, reduced
the non-economic damages award in the survival action to $350,000, and
denied all other motions." [d. at 552, 719 A.2d at 122-23.
75. [d. at 564-65, 719 A.2d at 129.
76. See Shields, 350 Md. at 673-77, 714 A.2d at 884-86; Scott, 278 Md. at 165-66,
359 A.2d at 552.
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leased premise. 77 This change, however, is a drastic shift in reasoning
which the court casually adopts.
E.

Landlords, Policemen-Same Thing?

Those familiar with the holdings of the court in Matthews, Shields,
and Scott, were likely not su~rised by the headline appearing in The
Daily Record onJune 17, 2003. 8 The headline read: "Landlord May Be
Liable for Murder in Apartment."79 The holding in Hemmings II
raises many questions. How can a landlord protect his or her tenants
from murders perpetrated by third parties within the tenants' own
apartments? Are landlords now law enforcement agents? Are landlords insurers of safety? Not only is the holding far-reaching, the majority does what the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated many times
that it refrained from doing: it turns landlords into the ultimate insurers of tenants' safety.
1.

The Facts of Hemmings II and the Midnight Burglar

Howard Hemmings and his wife, Suzette, resided on Lynfair Court
in a two-bedroom apartment unit located on the second floor just
above the ground level apartment. 80 The second-floor apartment sat
adjacent to the woods. 81 "As with all of the apartments in the development, unit A-2 was equipped with deadbolt locks and 'Charlie-bars,'
which secured the sliding glass doors of the apartment balconies."82
In the middle of the night on June 13, 1998, an unidentified person
entered the apartment through the back sliding glass door and fatally
shot Howard. 83 He died shortly thereafter. 84
The intruder was likely not someone Howard and Suzette Hemmings knew. Suzette Hemmings' complaint stated that the intruder
entered the apartment by forcing open the locked sliding glass door
located on the second floor balcony at the back of the building. 85 Evidence obtained through subsequent on-scene investigation was consistent with a forced entry.86
77. Matthews, 351 Md. at 565,719 A.2d at 129. The majority stated that "[t]he
'control' factor upon which the Court relied in Shields was not the traditional landlord control over common areas. Rather, as in the instant case,
it was the landlord's control over the tenant's remaining in the leased
premises." [d.
78. See Lawrence Hurley, Landlord May Be Liable for Murder in Apartment, DAILY
RECORD, June 17, 2003, at lB.
79. [d.
80. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528, 826 A.2d at 446.
81. Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. at 314,797 A.2d at 853, rel/d, 375 Md. 522, 826
A.2d 443.
82. [d.
83. [d.
84. [d.
85. [d.
86. [d.

2004]

2.

Don't Buy . . . Rent!

141

The Majority's Reasoning in Hemmings II

As previously mentioned, the majority held that the landlord may
be liable for the tragic death of Howard Hemmings. 87 Similar to the
holdings in Matthews, where the injuries were tragic, the court found a
reason to create an exception to the once well-established rule that
the landlord is not the insurer of tenants' safety.88 In Hemmings II,
the court's caveat is similar to the one in Matthews. The majority
stated that "a landlord is not necessarily immune from liability because a tenant's injury occurred within' the leased premises."89
Rather, a landlord's duty to use reasonable care for the tenant's safety
within the common areas also applies to injuries suffered from criminal acts within the leased premises. 90 A landlord's duty stems from
the fact that he is in a better position to control the security measures
and from the fact that he may have knowledge that criminal activity
on the premises has created a dangerous condition. 91 Accordingly,
the landlord must take reasonable measures to eliminate the criminal
activity.92
The Hemmings II court held that" [0] nce a landlord takes reasonable security measures to eliminate conditions that contribute to criminal activity on the premises, all of its duties ... have not been fulfilled
necessarily."93 Instead, "a landlord has a continuing obligation to
properly carry out the security measures it provides."94 This means a
landlord must "maintain and regularly inspect the devices implemented to deter criminal activity."95 For example, in Hemmings II,
the landlord had implemented several security devices. 96 The court
held, however, that if the landlord failed to adequately maintain these
security measures, the landlord may have breached its duties towards
its tenants and Howard Hemmings. 97
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 542, 826 A.2d at 455.
Id.
Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455.
Id. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455.
Id. at 543-44, 826 A.2d at 455-56.
Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 546, 826 A.2d at 457. But see infra Part IV.C.
Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 546, 826 A.2d at 457.
Id. at 547, 826 A.2d at 458.
Specifically, there was "exterior lighting around the property" and the
apartment had "a regular door lock on its front door as well as a dead bolt
door lock." Id. at 528,826 A.2d at 446. Additionally, "[f]or the apartments
with patio doors, like the Hemmings', the Landlord provided ... 'a charlie
bar,' a horizontally mounted bar securing the sliding glass door." Id. at
528, 826 A.2d at 446-47. '''[T]he [apartment] windows ha[d] locks on
them,' and there was 'interior lighting in the common area hallways.'" Id.
Ground level apartments had alarm systems, which would generate a
"strong and loud noise" if activated. Id. at 528, 826 A.2d at 447.
97. Id. at 547-48, 826 A.2d at 458.
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3. Judge Raker's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Raker's dissent, which was joined by Judge Cathell and Judge
Harrell, addressed the flaws in the majority's holding. Judge Raker
stated unequivocally that the only way in which the majority reached
the "desired result [was] to cobble together the line of cases in Maryland imposing a duty for liability for physical harm which occurred in
the common areas with the line of cases finding liability for demised
premise damage resulting from a cause originating in the common
area."98 Judge Raker reiterated that "[a] landlord is not the insurerof
the safety of persons within the demised premises, or for that matter,
in the common areas of 'the property."99 Most importantly, she acknowledged that the majority's holding "is a novel theory, unsupported by any authority or case law in the country."lOO It is
unsupported precisely because of its unreasonableness in tort theory
and property law, and because of its undeniably broad consequences
for landlords and tenants alike. 101

III.

A COMPARISON VIEW: OTHER STATES EXPRESSLY REFUSE
TO EXPAND THE LIABILI1Y OF LANDLORDS

As discussed above, the extension of landlord liability for injuries
sustained by the criminal acts of others is a relatively novel concept,
not only in Maryland, but in other jurisdictions. The first decisive case
regarding the matter was the 1970 decision of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.102 In Kline, a tenant was injured when she
was attacked and robbed in the common area of her apartment complex. 103 Finding that the landlord could be held liable for criminal
attacks sustained by tenants in the common areas, the court stated
that although "[t]he landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety ... he
certainly is no bystander."104 The Kline court held that it is not unwarranted "to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps which
98. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 556-57, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, j., dissenting).
Judge Raker wrote:
The entire basis of the majority opinion rests upon inadequate
lighting in the rear of the apartment building. The majority holds
that because the landlord provided exterior lighting at Pelham
Wood as a security measure intended to deter criminal activity, it
had a duty to adequately maintain that lighting .... From this duty
to maintain adequate lighting in the 'common area, the majority
makes the unjustified leap in logic that somehow the landlord is
then responsible for violent criminal activity that occurred within
the demised premises and not within the common area.
Id. at 551,826 A.2d at 460 (Raker,j., dissenting).
99. Id. at 552, 826 A.2d at 461 (Raker, j., dissenting).
100. Id. at 557, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, j., dissenting).
101. See infra Parts III-N.
102. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
103. Id. at 478.
104. Id. at 481.
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are within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his tenants."105 In holding the landlord owed that duty to his tenants, the
court found that the following circumstances had occurred: the landlord had "notice of repeated criminal assaults and robberies, ha[d]
notice that the crimes occurred in the portion of the premises exclusively within his control, ha[d] every reason to expect like crimes to
happen again, and ha[d] the exclusive power to take preventive
action."106
Although jurisdictions vary in their approach to the issue, many
states have refused to adopt the holding in Kline, imposing liability on
landlords in certain cases involving criminal acts of third parties occurring within the leased premises. 107 In fact, many states have addressed situations almost identical to Hemmings 11,108 yet declined to
extend landlord liability as far as the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 109

A.

Failure of the Landlord to Secure Doors or Windows

The following states have refused to expand landlord liability in actions involving crimes against the person occurring within the tenant's
apartment. Specifically, the following cases involve a third party criminal entering the victim's apartment, allegedly due to the landlord's
failure to secure the doors or windows of the residential apartment
building.

105. [d.
106. [d. See also Haines, supra note 30, at 314-22 (discussing the Kline decision

and landlords' developing duty to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts).
107. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
108. In Hemmings II, the allegations of negligence included the landlord's failure to maintain adequate lighting and secure the locks of the sliding glass
door. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 532, 826 A.2d 443, 449. Other states
that have addressed similar cases include Arkansas, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See discussion infra Part
III.A-B.
109. According to one critic:
The recent cases are not unanimous; and there are recent decisions which follow the common law majority rule and reject the
idea of imposing liability on the landlord for the wrongful acts of
third parties. A number of rationales are put forth in support of
majority rule including, among others, (i) the idea that the intentional criminal act of a third person is a superseding cause of harm
to the tenant, (ii) the difficulty of determining the foreseeability of
the criminal act, and (iii) judicial reluctance to modifY traditional
landlord-tenant concepts.
DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAw IN A NUTSHELL 79 (West Publishing Co. 1986) (1979). See also discussion infra Part IV.
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Illinois

In Martin v. Usher, llO a tenant brought an action against her landlord for damages, charging that she was injured in her apartment as a
result of being shot by an intruder who robbed and attempted to rape
her. l l l The Illinois court held there was no duty on behalf of the
landlord to protect the tenant from the criminal acts of a third
party.112 The court expressly refused to impose a legal duty on the
landlord. 113

2.

Massachusetts

In Choy v. First Columbia Management, Inc.,114 a tenant brought an
action against her former landlord asserting claims of negligence and
breach of contract arising from her brutal beating and rape that occurred in her apartment. 1l5 The tenant alleged "that locks on the
doors to the building were constantly broken or unlocked providing
easy access to the intruders."1l6 The United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, applying Massachusetts law, held that
the causal connection between the asserted negligence and the injury
was too attenuated to allow a jury to find more likely than not that the
assailant gained access to the complex in this manner. 117
1l0. 371 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App: Ct. 1977).
lli. [d. at 70.
112. [d.

113. [d. (quoting Smith v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 344 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976)}. Specifically, the Illinois court adhered to the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the court characterized as setting forth:
[Under § 315] there is no duty to control the conduct of a third
person to such a degree as to prevent him from causing physical
harm to another, unless a special relationship exists between the
actor and the other. Sections 314 and 320 of the Restatement list
certain special relationships, such as common carrier-passenger,
business invitor-invitee and innkeeper-guest. In Illinois the landlord-tenant relationship has not been considered a special relationship which could create the existence of a duty.
[d. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314,
315,320 (1965).
114. 676 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1987).
115. [d. at 29.
116. [d.
117. [d. While the court declined to answer the question of whether the landlord owes a duty to the tenant, it found that "the plaintiff ha[d] produced
no evidence from which ajury could rationally decide that the defendants'
negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries." [d. at 29-30. The court recognized that " [c]ausation is an essential element of the plaintiff's case in an
action for negligence. Proof that the defendant breached a duty owed to
plaintiff is not enough to establish liability. To recover for her injuries, the
plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and plaintiff's harm." [d. at 30 (citing Canon v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 374 N.E.2d 582,584 (Mass. 1978}).
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New York

Pagan v. Hampton Houses, Inc. ll8 involved the tragic occurrence of
a tenant found murdered in her apartmentY9 In Pagan, reports indicated that violence had occurred within the building, that a security
guard was not always present, and that locks to various entrances were
broken. 120 The New York court, however, held that the "plaintiff
ha[d] failed to come forward with evidence that negligence, if any, on
the part of the landlord ... was the proximate cause of the [tenant]' s
injuries and death."121
In Perry v. New York City Housing Authority,122 another New York case,
a tenant's ex-boyfriend attacked her with a knife after forcibly entering her apartment. 123 The tenant brought an action against the landlord alleging that the landlord's negligent failure to provide adequate
locks resulted in her injuries. 124 The court noted that "with regard to
the allegation that the outside doors to the building were unlocked,
the [tenant] offers no evidence that her assailant took advantage of
the unlocked doors to enter the building."125 The tenant "raised no
factual issue as to whether the unlocked doors were a proximate cause
of her injuries."126 The landlord was entitled to summary
judgment. 127

4.

Ohio

In Carmichael v. Colonial Square Apartments,128 a tenant who had been
assaulted in his apartment brought an action against his landlord alleging that the landlord's failure in providing adequate security for
the common areas constituted negligence. 129 The court affirmed
summary judgment for the landlord holding that the landlord had
only a duty to provide reasonable security to tenants and was "not an
insurer of the premises against criminal activity."130 Moreover, the
court held that, "assuming [the landlord] breached a duty to provide
reasonable security, [the tenant] has failed to present any evidence
118. 589 N.Y.S.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (mem.).
119. [d. at 472.
120. [d.
121. [d.

122. 635 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (mem.).
[d. at 662.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 663.

128. 528 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
129. [d. at 586.
130. [d. at 586-87 (quoting Sciascia v. Riverpark Apartments, 444 N.E.2d 40, 42

(Ohio Ct. App. 1981)).
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upon which reasonable minds could differ that its failure was the
proximate cause of his injuries."131

5.

Wisconsin

In Rowinski v. R.echt-Goldin-Siegl Construction, Inc.,132 a tenant brought
an action after being raped in her apartment. 133 The tenant alleged
that the landlords were negligent in failing to provide a locked entrance with an intercom system or security personnel. 134 The court,
while finding the negligence action supportable, rejected the tenant's
claim based on Wisconsin's safe place statute. 135 The court pointed
out that "an owner of a public building is liable only for structural
defects and unsafe conditions associated with the structure."136 The
court found that" [f] ailure to provide an electronic monitoring system
at the entranceway to an apartment complex does not constitute a
structural defect within the meaning of the safe place statute."137
B.

Failure of the Landlord to Repair or Replace Lights

The following states have held that landlords cannot be held liable
for damages suffered by the tenant as a result of the criminal acts of a
third party. Specifically, these cases involve situations in which entry
into the victim's apartment was allegedly due to improper lighting or
the failure of the landlord to repair or replace lights.
1.

Arkansas

In Bartley v. Sweetser,138 a tenant filed an action against her landlords
for negligence. 139 The tenant alleged that the landlords breached
their duty of care by failing to implement reasonable security measures to prevent foreseeable criminal acts. 140 The tenant argued that
the landlords had, inter alia, failed to provide adequate lighting of the
common areas. 141 The court held that "a landlord, under Arkansas
law, is not the insurer of the safety of tenants or others upon the
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 587.
No. 82-1695, 1983 WL 161541, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.11 (West 2004). The safe place statute
establishes that employers and landlords must provide a safe environment
for their employees or tenants. Id. § 101.11 (1). The statute applies only to
unsafe physical conditions of the premises, not to activities conducted on
premises. See id. § 101.11(1)-(2); see also Korenak v. Curative Workshop
Adult Rehab. Ctr., 237 N.w.2d 43,47 (Wis. 1976).
Rowinski, 1983 WL 161541, at *2.
Id.
890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
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premises."142 Thus, the landlord did not owe the tenant a duty to
protect the tenant from criminal acts. 143

2.

South Carolina

Cramer v. Balcor Property Management, Inc.,144 involved a wrongful
death action brought by the personal representative of a tenant murdered in her apartment by an intruder.I4s The intruder entered her
apartment by prying open a sliding glass door. I46 The plaintiff argued
that the landlord had not maintained sufficient lighting on the property.I47 The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, applying South Carolina law, held that the landlord had no
special duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third parties. I48 The court reasoned that even though "a landlord has a duty to
maintain the common areas of a leased property in a safe condition,"
the rule had "never been applied in South Carolina to anything except physical injuries resulting directly from the condition of the premises themselves."149
IV.

LANDLORDS AS INSURERS: THE LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE HEMMINGS II DECISION

The decision of the majority in Hemmings II clearly went too far in
holding that landlords must be insurers against possible criminal activity.ISO As stated by the court numerous times, there is no general duty
to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third party absent a special dUty.ISI Based on obvious public policy reasons,
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 252.
Id.
848 F. Supp. 1222 (D.S.C. 1994).
Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1223-24.
Id. at 1225.
Id. at 1224 (quoting Cramer v. Ba1cor Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 441 S.E.2d 317,
319 (S.c. 1994)).
149. Id. at 1225 (quoting Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1211
(D.S.C. 1990)). The court states that "the Supreme Court of South Carolina has expressly ruled that a landlord has no duty to a tenant to provide
security in and around a leased premises to protect the tenant from criminal activity of third parties." Id.
150. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 545, 826 A.2d at 457.
151. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1975) (holding
that "there is no special duty imposed upon the landlord to protect his
tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord's premises"); See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS,
§ 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing consistent refusal to impose a duty to rescue); Haines, supra note 30, at 306-07. Haines stated:
Courts did impose a duty for third party criminal acts where certain
recognized "special relationship[s]" were found. These relationships were seen to be of such character that public policy dictated
that one party should have an obligation to use reasonable care to
protect the other from third party criminal acts. The relationships
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"[ c] ourts have generally held ... that it is not fair to impose upon the
landlord a duty to protect the tenant from criminal activity within the
demised area."152 The reason for not imposing liability on landlords
for the criminal acts of others perpetrated on tenants has been summarized as follows:

Judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common
law concept of the landlord-tenant relationship; the notion
that the act of a third person in committing an intentional
tort or crime is a superseding cause of the harm to another
resulting therefrom; the oftentimes difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of
the standard which the landlord must meet; the economic
consequences of the imposition of the duty; and the conflict
with the public policy allocating the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the government rather than the
private sector. 153
Such policy considerations must be carefully analyzed when changing
the common law by imposing such an encumbering duty upon landlords. 154 The majority in Hemmings II, however, failed to address
these policy considerations in imposing the ultimate duty of insurer
on landlords in Maryland.

A. Judicial Reluctance to Tamper with the Traditional Common Law Concept of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
As discussed above, under the common law in Maryland l55-and
throughout the United States-it was well-established that a landlord

152.
153.

154.
155.

in which such a duty has been imposed include innkeeper-guest,
possessor of premises open to the public-invitee, common carrierpassenger, employer-employee, school district-pupil, and hospitalpatient.
Id. at 307-08.
Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,]., dissenting) (citing
Bartley v. Sweetser, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ark. 1994»; ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 4:14 (1980).
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 151, § 4.14 (quoting Kline v. Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970» (alteration in original). See also
Bartley, 890 S.W.2d at 251. The court stated that:
Although some jurisdictions have held a landlord, under certain circumstances, owes a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
a tenant from foreseeable criminal acts committed by intruders on
the premises ... the courts have generally found that, as a matter
of public policy, it was not fair to impose this duty of protection on
the landlord.
Id. But see Kline, 439 F.2d at 481 (holding that the landlord owed a duty of
protection to tenant because landlord was placed on notice of foreseeable
criminal acts by third parties but took no preventive action).
See Hemmings II, 357 Md. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,]., dissenting).
See discussion supra Part II.A-D.
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had no duty to protect tenants. 156 Historically, the landlord was not
responsible to his tenants based on the idea that the lease was a conveyance of property to the tenant. 157 After the transfer of property
and rent occurred, "the landlord's obligation during the term was the
passive one of noninterference with the tenant's use or possession" of
that leased property. ISS As such, "an obligation to protect the tenant
from unauthorized acts by third persons was neither warranted nor
imposed" by the courts. 159
Abiding by this recognized doctrinal notion, courts were reluctant
to impose a duty upon landlords. 160 Only within the last thirty years,
since the controversial decision in Kline,161 have courts acknowledged
the duty of a landlord to protect tenants from the criminal acts of
third parties based solely on a negligence theory.162
The Court of Appeals of Maryland continued to reject the doctrinal
change until the split decision in Hemmings II in 2003. 163 Clearly, in
Maryland there was "(j] udicial reluctance to tamper with the [precedent established by the] common law concept of the landlord-tenant
relationship."164 Moreover, evidenced by the split decision, there was
reluctance by three of the seven judges sitting on the court of appeals
in deciding Hemmings 11.165
The judicial reluctance most likely stemmed from fundamental notions of American property law. One such notion is the concept of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 166 A lessee has the right to peacefully inhabit his or her rented premise without undue interference
156. See Haines, supra note 30, at 309 (stating that "courts historically have not
characterized the landlord-tenant relationship as a special relationship").
157. [d.
158. [d.
159. [d.
160. [d. at 304 (stating that " [t]hrough the 1960's, the courts generally continued to stress property law concepts").
16l. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 482; see also Haines, supra note 30, at 301 (stating that
"[a] lthough the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Kline attempted to portray its decision as a natural outgrowth of
precedent and analogy, the opinion actually constituted a significant departure from established rules").
162. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 540, 826 A.2d at 453 (stating that the court
"recognized that general principles of negligence require a landlord to 'exercise reasonable care for the tenant's safety'" (quoting Scott v. Watson,
278 Md. 160, 167, 359 A.2d. 548, 553 (1975»; see also Uoe v. Dominion
Bank of Washington, N.A., 963 F.2d 1552, 1559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Spar v.
Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 179 n.5 (D.C. 1977); Tenney v. At!. Assocs., 594
N.W.2d 11,17 (Iowa 1999).
163. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443.
164. [d. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465 (Raker,j., dissenting) (quoting Kline, 439 F.2d at
481).
165. Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 549, 826 A.2d at 459 (Raker, j., dissenting).
166. See generally RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTI § 16B.03
(l04th release 2004).
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from the landlord. 167 This concept is arguably inherent to all tenants:
the renter pays rent in return for the landlord permitting occupancy.
For the most part, tenants do not want or need their landlord to be
a vigilante because they value their right to quiet enjoyment. Most
individuals rank the right to privacy and property as main facets of the
American way of life, and tenants are no different. But because tenants do not own property, are such rights non-existent? Unequivocally, the answer to this question is no. Tenants seek and are given
their rights to quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and privacy associated with their property in a manner consistent with the lease .
.The courts would never take away rights of tenants because the
rights are ingrained in our notions of property; on the other hand,
landlords' duties continue to expand. 168 More is expected of landlords, and the judiciary has imposed more responsibility upon
them. 169 Such expansion has undoubtedly changed the nature of a
landlord. Previously, a landlord's role in the landlord-tenant relationship consisted solely of providing property for tenants to enjoy peacefully, privately, and without unwarranted disruption. 170 With the
holdings in Hemmings II and Matthews, a landlord can no longer allow their tenants quiet enjoyment; rather, the landlord must become
the cliche "big-brother," watching for any sign of harm that may afflict
the tenant. Not only does this new role usurp American ideals of privacy and individual responsibility, it overturns traditional common law
doctrine.

B.

Superseding Cause of Harm Must Be Acknowledged

The Court of Appeals of Maryland failed to address the issue of causation, most likely because it is often an insurmountable issue when
dealing with the criminal acts of third parties. 171 The majority's failure to address causation is evidence of the fundamental weakness in
holding a landlord liable for the criminal acts of third parties perpetrated upon tenants,l72 as "[c]ausation is an essential element of the
plaintiff's case in an action for negligence."173 Liability cannot be established simply on the grounds that "the defendant breached a duty
See id. at § 16B.03(1).
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part II.
See Quinn & Phillips, supra note 23, at 227 & n.2.
See Haines, supra note 30, at 309 (stating that an "obstacle to finding landlord liability in a tort action has been proof of causation").
172. The court of special appeals, however, did address causation in deciding
Hemmings I, stating that" [f] rom the facts presented, a fact finder would be
constrained to conclude that there could be no showing that appellees'
failure to maintain the common areas was the proximate cause of the fatal
event." Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. 311, 323-24, 797 A.2d 851, 859 (2002).
173. Choy v. First Columbia Mgmt., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D. Mass. 1987).

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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owed to plaintiff."174 Rather, "[t]o recover for her injuries, the plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and plaintiff's harm.,,175 Specifically, the tenant must prove
that the landlord's action, or in the case of security, failure to act, was
the proximate cause of the tenant's i~ury.I76
Consider the circumstances of Hemmings 11.177 One reason the
plaintiff provided for the landlord's liability was that there was no exterior lighting in the back of the building. I78 From the fact that there
was no lighting in the back of the apartment, as opposed to the front,
it does not follow that the landlord is responsible for a criminal breaking into a locked door in the middle of the night. There is no logical
leap of causation in this circumstance;I79 the causal connection is too
attenuated. Therefore, even though the court of appeals h~ established that a landlord has a duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of others, and that duty would be breached by failing to
maintain adequate security measures,I80 the issue of causation will always be virtually impossible to prove when dealing with criminal acts
of third parties. I81

174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass.
1978».
176. See Haines, supra note 30, at 310 (stating that "[t]he problem is whether to
treat the landlord's conduct as the proximate cause of the tenant's injury,
or to consider the third party's intervening criminal act as a superseding
cause, relieving the landlord of liability").
177. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 528-31, 826 A.2d at 446-49.
178. Id. at 532, 826 A.2d at 449. In Hemmings II, several tenants of the apartment building where Mr. and Mrs. Hemmings lived, 5 Lynfair Court, recalled the state of the lighting around their building prior to the incident at
the Hemmings' apartment. One indicated that there was "not a light fixture against the wall ... outside of [her] apartment" in the rear of 5 Lynfair
Court. Another who lived immediately below the Hemmings' apartment at
the time of the incident, described the lighting at the rear of the building
as follows: "Pitch dark. You can't see anything. Even if I would look
outside, I couldn't identifY anyone in that area because it is really dark." Id.
at 529, 826 A.2d at 447. That tenant stated that the front of 5 Lynfair Court
was well-lit but that the back of the building was not equipped with a working light and was "too dark." Id.
179. Id. at 551, 826 A.2d at 460 (Raker, j., dissenting). Judge Raker's dissenting
opinion states:
The entire basis of the majority opinion rests upon inadequate
lighting in the rear of the apartment building. . . . From this duty
to maintain adequate lighting in the common area, the majority
makes the unjustified leap in logic that somehow the landlord is
then responsible for violent criminal activity that occurred within
the demised premises and not within the common area.
Id.
180. See id. at 546, 826 A.2d at 458.
181. See Haines, supra note 30, at 309-10.
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The Problem of Foreseeability

Criminal behavior and criminal activity may be foreseeable by law
enforcement officers in'some rare instances, but no one has the capacity to accurately predict when, where, and how a violent criminal
will act. There would be no crime if that were the case. Furthermore,
does the absence of security measures outside an apartment make the
occurrence of criminal activity within the leased premise more probable? While the majority in Hemmings II asserts that" [k] nowledge is
essential to establishing a landlord's dUty,"182 the idea that a landlord
can foresee criminal activity inside an apartment and subsequently act
to prevent it forces the landlord into a vigilante role.
The majority in Hemmings II believes that a landlord should realize
that a lack of security devices or deterrents may enhance the likelihood
that a tenant will be the victim of a criminal attack. 18S Yet the failure
to maintain lighting, provide security guards, install surveillance cameras, or invest in alarm systems does not necessarily "make a murder
within the leased premises foreseeable,"184 nor does it reduce the likelihood of crime. The court simply assumes that the landlord's failure
to provide security will certainly lead to crime. 185 The majority, however, lacks any concrete evidence to support the contention that if
landlords maintain security devices, less crime will occur on the premises; rather, the majority's reasoning is only based on anecdotal evidence and speculation. 186
Moreover, if the landlord can foresee criminal activity, is it unreasonable to assume that tenants recognize that there is criminal activity
within their neighborhood? Tenants do not unknowingly decide to
live in an area that is high in crime. For example, before Howard
Hemmings was murdered, there were records of complaints regarding
182.
183.
184.
185.

Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 540, 826 A.2d at 454.
Id. at 541, 826 A.2d at 454.
Id. at 561,826 A.2d at 466 (Raker,]., dissenting).
According to one study,
'crime prevention today as in the past has a tendency to be driven
more by rhetoric than reality.' However, effective public policy and
practice need to be based on scientific evidence. This is an approach that has garnered much support in medicine and other
fields dedicated to the betterment of society. This is not, however,
the practice usually adopted in criminology or criminal justice. Anecdotal evidence, program favorites of the month, and political ideology seemingly drive much of the crime policy agenda. As a
result, we are left with a patchwork of programs that are of unknown potential in preventing crime. Crime prevention programs
mayor may not work or worse yet may produce harmful or iatrogenic results.
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Toward an Evidence-Based Approach
to Preventing Crime, 578 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 158, 159 (2001)
(internal citation omitted).
186. See id. at 159 (discussing the lack of crime prevention policies based on
scientific-rather than anecdotal-evidence).
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criminal activity within the apartment complex. 187 Pelham Wood, located in Baltimore County, was not a peaceful neighborhood. 188
Rather, "[t]he Police Department had filed crime reports for twenty
nine burglaries or attempted burglaries and two armed robberies that
had occurred at Pelham Wood over the two-year period preceding the
incident involving [Howard] Hemmings."189 The violent nature of
this community was arguably known to members of this community
based on the types of crimes committed. Specifically," [0] ne of the
alleged armed robberies took place inside an apartment unit; the
other involved an assailant who, bearing a sub-machine gun, approached the victim from the woods near an apartment building.,,19o
Residents notice these types of activities.
When tenants choose to live in high crime areas, they assume the
risk that crime will occur.191 Individual tenants are able to make
choices regarding where they live. 192 If a tenant feels unsafe, he or
she has the ability to relocate, to call the police, to change the locks
on the doors and subsequently bill the landlord, or take other remedial measures to protect him or herself from crime. 193 When a tenant
has adequate knowledge of criminal activity, as in the case of Howard
187. Hemmings I, 144 Md. App. at 315, 797 A.2d at 854. The complaints concerned the following:
robbery, threats at gun point by an estranged husband, a shooting
incident at the apartment complex; the 'constant stream of questionable visitors, or the tormenting by wild young children,' vandalism, apartment break-ins, storage break-ins, theft from balconies,
theft from common areas, robbery outside of a tenant's apartment
allegedly due to poor lighting, drug use in the common areas, possible intruders peeping into tenant windows or patio doors, requests for locks on patio screen doors, complaints that young men
were using the apartment entrance for suspicious activities, complaints about increasing fears due to lack of maintenance and unlocked doors.
[d. at 316 n.2, 797 A.2d at 854 n.2.
188. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 530-31, 826 A.2d at 448.
189. [d. at 530, 826 A.2d at 448.
190. [d.
191. Assumption of risk is normally a complete bar to an action for negligence.
See Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 535, 572 A.2d 1115,
1123 (1990).
192. See Shelly Ross Saxer, "Am [ My Brother's Keeper?": Requiring Landowner Discl".
sure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REv.
522, 543 (2001), the author stated that
[f1ault for injuries suffered from a third party criminal act
may ... be apportioned between the landowner and the victim in
situations where the victim fails to take appropriate protective action. If the victim fails to use proper door locks, somehow provokes or initiates the attack, or is aware of the danger or risk and
does not take appropriate precautions against injury, the victim's
compensation may be reduced according to such fault.
193. See id.
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Hemmings, and takes no steps to remedy the situation or protect himself, he too bears the responsibility for his injuries. 194

D.

Duty to Warn Tenants?

Another issue that arises regarding the foreseeability element195 is
whether landlords have a duty to warn prospective tenants of the possibility of crime within the leased premises. The majority in Hemmings II fails to acknowledge that their far-reaching decision may
impose far greater duties on landlords than intended. Specifically, if
the landlord has knowledge of criminal activity, must the landlord disclose information about the criminal tendencies in, on, or about the
premises?l96 The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not address this
issue, but it seems likely to arise in the future.
According to one scholar, the landlord may face liability if he or she
misrepresents the safety of the premises to a tenant. 197 Specifically, "if
a prospective tenant asks the landlord about the safety of the premises
or whether the property is subject to criminal activity, the landlord
must answer truthfully or be subject to liability for misrepresentation."198 Of course landlords should not misrepresent whether the
premises are safe; however, if the tenant does not inquire about safety,
a landlord may be under an obligation to disclose such information or
be subject to liability. Mter the holdings in Hemmings II and Matthews, if the landlord had knowledge of the potential dangerous situation and did not act to remedy it, liability follows. Landlords now
must diligently warn potential tenants of criminal activity.
Another issue arises if the threat of criminal activity is not an
outside force, but rather another tenant. Does a landlord have a duty
to warn other tenants within the building or premises? For example,
if the landlord knows there is a registered sexual offender residing in
the building, should the landlord disclose such information in an attempt to protect other tenants?199 Such a dilemma raises additional
194. See id.
195. See discussion supra Part IV.e.
196. See Saxer, supra note 191, at 549-50 (discussing this concept in a section
entitled "Lessor's Duty to Disclose Potential Danger to Prospective Tenants
During Rental Process for Lease of Premises").
197. Id. at 550.
198. Id. See alsoYuzefovsky v. St.John'S Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134,14041 (Va. 2001) (holding that tenant's allegations of misrepresentation regarding the security of the premises did not establish one of the narrow
exceptions to the general rule that a landlord was not required to warn or
protect tenants from the criminal acts of third parties occurring on the
landlord's property).
199. See Saxer, supra note 191, at 562 (stating that "[iJn jurisdictions where a
landlord owes a duty to protect tenants against third party criminal acts, a
landlord may be faced with a decision either to warn tenants about the
criminal propensities of another tenant, or to evict the potentially offending tenant in order to avoid harm to others").
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legal issues for the landlord, for example, liability for disclosure of
possible confidential information, liability for invasion of privacy, or
liability for defamation. 20o Furthermore, the landlord runs the risk of
tenants vacating the premises.
With the extended responsibilities that result from the holding in
Hemmings II, landlords may resort to screening tenants for possible
criminal tendencies or vulnerability to criminal attacks. 201 In order to
screen out potential criminals, landlords may interview potential tenants and reject applicants with criminal records or those who pose a
risk as "potential criminals."202 Although "[u]sing a criminal record
to reject a tenant should not [result in] potential liability for the landlord,"203 it places the landlord in a position in which he can discriminate arbitrarily and with discretion "so long as excluding the tenant
does not violate public policy or civil rights."204 There is no way to
ensure that landlords are not subconsciously basing their screening
on criteria that violates public policy or civil rights. 205 For example,
"[t]he landlord's biases regarding race, age or sex may contribute to
the selection process."206 As such, the court of appeals has made it
more likely that landlords will subconsciously discriminate in order to
make the premises safer in an effort to avoid liability.
E.

Vagueness oj the Security Standard That the Landlord Must Meet

The Hemmings II majority did not discuss the standard for security
and protection that the landlord must meet. 207 The majority only reiterates that the security measures be "reasonable."208 It has been argued that" [g) ate systems, video cameras, security guards, alarms, and
other potential mechanisms" may help safeguard tenants from potential third party criminals. 209 Although these are "reasonable measures,"210 it is unclear whether the landlord is required to maintain all
of the security mechanisms or only one of them. The standard will
obviously vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, which will be200. See generally id. at 562-63.
201. "It has also not been established whether a landlord has the duty to screen
prospective tenants to protect other tenants from criminal behavior or a
duty to warn other tenants of known criminal propensities of an existing
tenant." Id. at 523.
202. Id. at 564.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 567.
205. See Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing OUT Criminals: Finding Housing/or the
r.x-Offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131, 15556 (2003).
206. Id. at 156.
207. See generally Hemmings II, 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443.
208. Id. at 541, 826 A.2d at 454.
209. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERlY LAw § 17.08 (585th publication 2000).
210. See Hemmings II, 375 Md. at 541,826 A.2d at 454.
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come a mere guessing game for landlords regarding which security
measures he or she is obligated to implement.
F.

Economic Consequences of the Imposition of the Duty

Tenants expect that landlords have "insurance that will cover most
injuries that occur on the property."211 Mter the decision in Hemmings II, tenants will expect landlords to have insurance covering injuries inflicted by third party criminals. 212 According to one report,
the average "settlement[ ] paid by insurance companies on behalf of
landlords for crimes like rape and assault in the U.S. is more than
$500,000."213 Additionally, "[t]he average jury award for cases that actually go to trial is $1.2 million."214 Thus, in order for a landlord to
maintain insurance that adequately covers the risk of million dollar
settlements, the cost of that insurance will be redistributed to the tenants through increased rent. 215 As a result, affordable living will decline throughout Maryland. Landlords' new roles as insurers of their
tenants' personal safety will have economic ramifications on those
who need protection the most, yet cannot afford an increase in rent.
One scholar acknowledges the problem in the allocation of costs,
stating:
[W] hile raising rents for improved security may be feasible
in luxury buildings, it is unrealistic to attempt to require tenants in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods to spend substantial additional sums in rental payments for the most·
effective crime deterrents available. Moreover, landlords
may be unable to raise rents, because of rent controllegislation. Thus, faced with a severe financial burden due to
greater security requirements, many landlords of deteriorating inner city housing, already operating at low profit margins, may abandon their unprofitable buildings, leading to
further urban decay and more crime. 216

211. Anthony A. Babcock, Peterson v. Superior Court: What Happened to the Paramount Policy?, 28 PAC. LJ. 373,413 (1997).
212. This expectation is based on the rationale expressed in Hemmings II that
landlords are in a "better position to abate the danger." See Hemmings II,
375 Md. at 539, 826 A.2d at 453.
213. Rental Housing Online, Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts and Activities, at
http://www.cses.com/manage/liability.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
214. Id.
215. See Kevin]. O'Donnell, Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants-The New
Duty to Protectjrom Foreseeable Attack, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 979,1002 (1983)
(discussing the economic consequences of landlord liability for third party
criminal attacks).
216. Haines, supra note 30, at 351.
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Landlords will be at a disincentive to invest in inner-city housing based
on the fact that criminal activity may be more rampant, placing them
in a vulnerable position of liability.217
Additionally, if landlords' cost of insurance increases based on the
liability landlords face after the decision in Hemmings II, it is likely
that landlords with few properties will suffer the economic consequences of the decision rather than those landlords who own more
property. Larger rental companies can afford insurance coverage and
the added cost of security measures to protect tenants from criminal
acts. On the other hand, landlords with few properties may not have
adequate resources to obtain insurance. In recent years, insurance
policy costs have risen for landlords, while the coverage has decreased. 218 The landlords with properties in high crime areas may be
unable to afford or receive adequate insurance coverage. 219
C.

Allocation oj the Duty oj Protecting Citizens from Criminal Acts Should
Remain with the Government, Not the Private Sector

Judicial decisions "holding a landlord liable for a third party's criminal actions against tenants, represent a shift of the public policing responsibility to landlords."220 Such duty can be characterized as "a
duty of crime prevention."221 Clearly, "establishing the broader principle-that a landlord can be responsible for criminal activities on
leased premises-has opened the door to an extension of the landlord's duty far beyond control and maintenance of the physical premises to direct control of the conduct of others."222
217. See id.
218. Ray A. Smith, Apartment Owners Face Growing Liahility: Rise in Potential Dangers
and Resulting Suits Send Insurance Premiums Higher, WALL ST. j., Apr. 24,
2002, at B8. Specifically, Smith states that" [p] remiums jumped an average
60% to 70% in 2001 from a year earlier, and 50% to 100% for policies
expiring at the end of 2002." Id. (citation omitted). Smith further states:
In 1999, the cost of liability insurance for an apartment property
averaged $20 per unit with no deductible required. . .. So a company with a portfolio of 5,000 units, for example, would pay a premium of $100,000. Nowadays, that cost averages $45 to $50 per
unit, and requires a minimum $5,000 deductible. The average deductible is closer to $25,000. That same company would now pay a
premium of $250,000 or more.
Id. (citations omitted).
219. See B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Gops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Grime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
679, 791 (1992) (stating that "[b]ecause of the high costs of discharging
their duty and the numerous possibilities for exposure to other forms of
liability, landlords are likely to abandon the landlord business rather than
meet the increased responsibilities").
220. Id. at 707.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 708.
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The bottom line question is how can a landlord control the actions
of others? Regardless of locks, security gates, charlie-bars, or adequate
lighting, a landlord's duty under Hemmings II extends to control the
actions of third parties. 223 Likely, this control will fall into the hands
of hired security guards; however, hired security guards are not law
enforcement officers maintained by the government. 224 Despite the
effectiveness of security measures, public policy dictates that the duty
to protect from criminal acts of third parties lies with law enforcement
officers. 225 Landlords are not police officers; even if landlords hire
pseudo-police officers, society has not placed its trust in landlords to
maintain public safety.226 Public safety and protection from criminals
remains in the hands of the government through the police force, not
landlords. 227

223. See id. at 688. Such "tort actions, alleging landlord liability for the criminal
actions of third parties, present several inconsistencies beyond the obvious
challenge to landlord immunity. For example, such causes of action seem
inconsistent with the common law doctrine that there is no duty to rescue
or protect another." Id.
224. See id. at 785-86. Specifically, the author states that:
The trend of increasing the responsibility of landlords to police their properties encourages this private approach to crime
fighting. From 1969 to 1990, the value of private security industries
rose from about $2.5 million to $18 billion annually, and the number of employees grew from fewer than 300,000 to nearly two million. Currently private security service personnel outnumber
public law enforcement personnel by more than two to one. Despite this growth, private security personnel are virtually unregulated and are generally less trained than their public counterparts.
There is direct evidence that landlords have responded to
crime with vigilante-type, private security measures. For example,
in Brooklyn, private police forces are 'hired by landlords to oust
drug dealers when the police cannot. ... The company's tools are
the same ones employed by its adversaries: violence and intimidation.' In one federally subsidized apartment complex, the Federal
Housing and Urban Development Office authorized rent levels
high enough to pay $655,200 annually to one such security company. These security services effectively operate to rid dangerous
and drug-infested properties of crime. However, the cost of this
effectiveness is unrestrained power in the hands of private citizens.
As one guard commented, "IT they spill one pin drop of our blood,
we spill gallons of theirs. . . . The cops have to play by the rules ....
But no one knows what we do."
Id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 791 (stating that "landlords who do undertake these private policing responsibilities present an undesirable risk of unrestrained
vigilantism") .
227. See id. (stating that "treating landlords as cops is not the answer to crime
control, but creating incentives for landlords to be responsible property
investors and managers may be").
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CONCLUSION

This comment rejects the notion that landlords should be the ultimate insurance policy for tenants. Although the Hemmings II decision has established a duty, the criminal acts of third parties are the
superseding cause of injury, over which the landlord has little or no
control. If the question reaches a jury, it follows that the issue of causation will be the most difficult hurdle to overcome.
Moreover, separate incidences of criminal activity are difficult to
forecast, notwithstanding a high crime area. If, however, one assumes
that criminal activity is easy to foresee, it follows that the tenant has
the responsibility to take action to protect him or herself from criminal activity. Individual responsibility must not be discarded through
the imposition of duties, as the court in Hemmings II clearly does.
The overarching policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of imposing no duty on landlords. Specifically, the economic consequences for tenants may affect those tenants who can least afford it. If
landlords increase rent to cover added insurance costs, the middleincome tenants will not suffer. Rather, the lower income tenants will
be displaced.
Finally, citizens place their trust for protection against crime, not in
landlords, but in police officers. In allocating a duty upon landlords
to protect against third party criminals, the court has usurped public
policy.
Teresa D. Teare

